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Abstract 
Central to this art icle is a basic phi losophical concept of the nature of man ' knowledge which exists amongst 
Protagorians of the sophist era, who postulates that 'man is the measure of all things' Our daily experience of 
human nature however, continues to give us reasons to unlearn much of what has turned out to be prejudices and 
errors in our conception of man. Consequently, The question "What is Man?" still perplexes us, and the answers 
we provide to this question often reveal how distorted our vision of history and thought have become over the 
years. Phi losophers and Psychologists who have approached the problem in terms of already accepted views and 
theories of the nature of man' knowledge continues to run in to more difficulties. In add ition, the absence of 
direct elaborat ion to the proposition has given rise to endless controversies about its meaning. This paper shall, 
via the reconstructive methods of critical analysis in philosophy, examine Protagoras' postulate of man 's 
knowledge of man against the Socratic philosophy of what the knowledge of man reall y is. The study reveals 
that there is yet a lot to be understood about Man. The reality of the absurdi ty of knowing and not knowing at the 
same time is however, identified as one factor that militates against man's quest towards attaining true 
knowledge. The paper submits that Protagoras' maxim about man is simply an opinion which acknowledges the 
truth of its denial. It fo llows that you can never know anything the truth of which you fa il to attain. 
Key Words: Man, Measure, Protagoras, Socratic, Sophist 
1. Introduction 
From antiquity till date, man has continued on an endless quest to discover and provide answers to fundamental 
questions that bothers around the nature of the world, the nature of his existence as an individual and the nature 
of his existence as a living being in the world (Wogu, 20 I 0:67) captures this point when he noted that "one thing 
that is sure is that people who lived in the past must have been driven by a desire to explain the world and the 
things or phenomenon around them". In antiquity, the most puzzling issues amongst thinkers then include: 
"What are things really like? How do changes in things take place? These basic questions were some of the 
questions that they had to grapple with. It is interesti ng to know that the explanations they offered to these 
questions became what was dubbed Philosophy - the love of wisdom. The origin of all these speculations came 
from the realization that things are not really the way they appear or what they seem to represent to the one 
viewing them. The realization that appearance after all , differed from reali ty- the phenomenon of growth, birth, 
death and decay- full y manifested in the coming into being and the passing a way of life into death. was one 
puzzl ing issues that thinkers could not help but attempt to find answers to . For (Stumpf, 2003:5-6). "these facts 
rai sed sweeping questions of how things and people came into existence at different times. and pass out or 
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existence only to be fo llowed by other things and persons". We wish to note that the many answers g iven by 
these ancient thinkers in response to the bugging question of their time were not really considered as important 
as when compared to the fac t that they auemptcd to offer scientific answers to these bugging questions in the 
first place. Examples of these aucmpts were contained in the mythological answers giving by llomer and 
lles iod. 
Fo r the major part of Antiquity among the Ancient Greeks, thinkers were manly preoccupied with questions that 
were centered on finding the single s tuff from where every other th ing emanated from. Among the prevail ing 
fundamen tal questions that prevai led duri ng this period include: What are things rea lly like? How can we expla in 
the processes of change in th ings? Can the knowledge of something really be possible? All this kind of th inking 
ended with the era of Leucippus, Dcmocritus and Anaxagoras whose focuses were extended to inquiries in the 
fields of atoms. In the era of the sophist however. there was a total deparlltre from the kind of inquiry and ideas 
that thinkers occupied themselves with. "Their ideas were very revolutionary for thei r time when contrasted with 
other philosophical doctrines which claimed the universe was based on something objecti ve outside the human 
innucnce" (Osimiri, 20 I I :85) Thinkers of the Sophist era and the golden age began to sec the need to >tan 
making practical usc of philosophy to solve all manners of problems which they encoun tered daily and mostly 
for the purpose of gain. Another very important point of departure for thinkers during this era was in their mode 
of thought and inqu iry into the subject of ·'Man" and all that concerns his nature and existence as a living being 
in time. This new point of departure, it has been argued, was one of the factors that were responsible for the 
major controversies that began during the time of the sophis t; a controversy which was centered on the 
pronouncement made by the early sophist Protagoras who sa id that "Man is the measure of all things" 
(Plato's Theaetellls at 152a). 
2. Protagoras and The Sophist 's Philosophy 
Protagoras Doctrines or philosophy can be identifies in three dist inctive specific areas: The Ouhocpeia, The 
Man -measure .\latement and Agnosticism. Rather than become one of the educators of his ti me, who offered 
specific and pract ical train ing in rhetoric or public speaking for money of some other kind of reward, Protagoras 
aucmpted to formulate a reasoned understand ing of a wide range of human phenomena, including language and 
education . He is also known to have had an interest in "orthoepeia" - the correct usc of words, although this 
to pic was more strongly assoc iated with his fellow sophist Prodicus. In his eponymous Platonic dialogue. 
Protagoras interprets a poem by Simonide~·. focusing on his usc of words, their literal meaning and the author's 
original intent. This type of education would have been useful for the interpretation of laws and other written 
documents in the Athenian courts" (T IEP, 1995: 15-23) He was also known to have said that "on any maller, 
there were often two arguments (logoi) opposed to one another. Accord ing to Aristotle, he was criticized for 
ha ving claimed to "make the weaker logos stronger (toll heuo logon kreiuo poiein)". (TSEP, 20 12). 
Of all his teachings and sayings, he was most famous for this saying: "Man is the measure of all things: of thi ngs 
which arc, that they are, and of thi ngs which arc not, that they are not" .l61 Wikipcdia notes that "Like many 
fragments of the Pre-Socratic's teachings, this phrase has been passed down to us without any context, as such: 
its meaning is open to various interpretations" (Wikipedia, 20 I I), Stud ies in this same vol ume of Wikipedia 
notes that the word XP~~tata (chremaw) ins tead of the general word ovta (onta, entities) suggests that Protagoras 
was re ferring to things that are used by or in some way related to humans. ' 'This makes a great difference in the 
meaning of hi s aphorism. Properties, soc ial entities, ideas, fee li ngs, j udgments, etc. are certainly XP~~tam and 
hence originate in the human mind". Wikipedia, 20 I I ), 
Plato ascribes re lati vis m to Protagoras and uses hi s predecessor's teachings as a foil for his own commitment to 
objective and transcendent real ities and values particularly those that relate to hi s aristocrat ic bad..ground. His 
major effort, through the words o f Socrates, is to convince his contemporaries that apct~ (w·eti!. virtue) is a 
present from the gods, which one either has or has not and that no sophist can teach virllte to people that do not 
already possess it. "Plato asc ribes Lo Protagoras an early form of phenomenalism", (Wild, 1942:88) in which 
what is or appears for a single ind ividual is true or real for that ind ividual. However, as it is clearly presented in 
the Theaetetus, Pro tagoras explains that some of such controversial views may result from an ill body or mind. 
He stresses that although all views may appear equally true, and perhaps should be equally respected, they are 
certainly no t of equal gravity. One may be useful and advantageous to the person that has it whi le another may 
prove harmful. He nce, the sophist arc there to teach the student how to d iscriminate between them, that is , to 
teach virtue. 
Protagoras was a proponent of agnosticism. In his lost work; On the Gods, he wrote: "Concerning the gods. I 
have no means of knowing whether they ex ist or not or of what sort they may be, because of the obscurity of the 
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subject, and the brevity of human life" (TlEP, 2006) 1101 According to Diogcnes Lacrti us, the outspoken agnostic 
position taken by Protagoras aroused anger, causing the Athenians to expel him from the city, and all copies of 
the book were collected and supposedly burnt in the marketplace. He is however known to have writte n several 
different works: Antifogiae and Truth. The latter was ci ted by Plato, and was known alternative ly as The 
Throws (a wrestling term referring to the attempt to floor an opponent). It began with the "man centered 
proposition" pronouncement. One of the main tasks of this paper is to find meaning beyond the protagorian 
proposition which strengthened his resolve to make the proposition about the val ue and essence of man in the 
sche me of things 
3. The Socratic Philosophy 
The Delphi Oracle is said to have confirmed ·'pronouncecf' Socrates as the wisest man on earth . The 
proclamation of the o racle at Delphi , studies reveal, had immeasurable influence on the life o f Socrates. 
Confirmed to be the wisest man that was li ving on the face of the earth, Socrates spent the rest o f hi s li fe with 
one mission in focus; which was to confirm or refute the proclamation by the gods. Consequently. Socrates went 
out, armed with the dialectic method as one of the major tools for achieving hi s assignment. Socrates d id not 
merely engage in sophistry, he was not interes ted in arguing for the sake of arguing; rather he was po ised to 
d iscover the essential nalllre o f Knowledge, Justice, Beauty, Goodness, and especially, the traits o f a good 
character such as Courage. 
Burrell describes ''The Socrat ic Methods" as a methodology which have been classified as a dialogue of search, 
" it is a straightforward but unsuccessful disc ussion as to how knowledge should be defined, for though it shows 
what knowledge is not, it fa ils to discover what knowledge is. But though in the characteristic Socratic fashion, it 
reaches on ly a negati ve result," (Burrclll 932:27-4 1) the argument is conducted with such skill that, as Professor 
Taylor puts it: " It is not too much to say that after more than two thousand years, the ultimate issues in 
"Epistemology" are still those which arc expounded with unequalled simplic ity in the Theaetctus, the best 
general introduction to the problem of knowledge ever composed." (Taylo, 1974:56) This is high praise, but it 
would be underrating its val ue to regard it merely as an epistemological essay in the conventional sense: for it is 
something much more importan t than the review and refutation of certain inadequate theories o f knowledge or 
than the positive suggestions which are thrown out in the di scussion. It is concerned with an issue s impler and 
more profound - an issue which interests the man in the street just as much as the student of philosophy. It is 
more suitably expressed in Pilate's question: "What is truth?" or, perhaps, in the questio n: "Is there any such 
thing as T ruth?" than in the sort of questions formu lated in the schools, e.g. how is experience possible'l Or what 
is "the original, certainty, and extent of human knowledge" 
The Philosophy that guides Socrates is seen to emanate from the maj or Influe nces he had during his life time as 
a yo uth, an adult and even as an elder statesman. These influences can be identified in virtually all hi s teac hi ngs, 
doctrines, methods, etc. The influences include his family background: ( I ) The life of a sculptor, a trade he 
learnt from his father. (2) The li fe of a mid wife, an experience he got from his mo ther. (3) The li fe of a guard 
fly, a n experience he got from the market place. All these experiences put together, studies show, are responsible 
for what we now know as the "Socratic Method''. 
"The Socratic Method" is perhaps, the most important contribution of Socrates to Western thought. This method 
of thought and enquiry has also been known as the method of "efenchus," which largely is applied to the 
examination of key moral concepts such as Good and Justice. It was first described by Plato in the Socratic 
Dialogues. The method basically requires that when one wishes to solve a problem, one firs t simply brakes clown 
the issue at stake into a series of questions, the answers to which gradually distill the answer you seek. The 
influence of thi s approach is most s trongly felt today in the use of the Sc ientific Method, in which hypothesis is 
the first stage. TI1e development and practice of thi s me thod is one of Socrates' most enduring contributions, and 
it is a key factor in learning his mantle as the father of political philosophy, ethics or moral philosophy, and as a 
figurehead of all the central themes in Western phi losophy. 
The Socratic Method is a negati ve method of hypothesis e limination, in that, better hypotheses arc found by 
stead il y identifying and e liminating those which lead to contradictions. It was designed to force one to examine 
one's own beliefs and the validity of such beliefs. In other words, The Socratic dialectic method is the search for 
the proper definition of a thing, a definition that will not permit refutation under the Socratic questi on ing. It was 
for thi s purpose that we c hoose to examine the proposition made by Protagoras with the Socratic Method. Let u~ 
note that the method does no t imply that the questioner knows the essential nature of knowledge. Rather it only 
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demonstrates that the questioner is skilled at detecting misconceptions and is revealing them by asking the right 
questions. 
4. Man Is The Measure Of All T hings; A Critical Ren ection 
Man 's quest to interpret man in the best possible way continues to reveal that most thinkers who undertake this 
task do so in terms of already accepted views of the nature of man. Others base their interpretation of man on 
certain theories of nature already adopted by men as a result of certain inclinations or orientat ion which is often 
tied to a particular school of thought. lt is therefore not necessary to argue that there is a relation, for to those 
who, like the Sophists of Greece, holds that "Of all things, The Measure is Man" (Jcan,2004:56-65) either in 
ethics o r epistemology; and to those like the Marx ists who make economic struggle the key to human history: or 
even to those who like Plato conceive of a world of Ideas to which the theory of man mu~t conform: the 
pragmatist Dewey, speaking in terms of biological adjustment, defines hi sto ry and l..nowledge in terms that make 
central hi s concept of man. Louis Kattsoff corroborates this idea when he no ted that : 
the galac tic system in which moves our solar system and includes the tiny 
planet known as Earth, on which men for a brief period have been writing 
phi losophy, may no t be anthropocentric; but the philosophy which is written 
is certainl y so in the de finite sense that it seeks to find man's place in the 
uni verse or to descry man's very existence as meaningless to man (Kattsoff. 
1953:452). 
To funhcr buttress this point, De La Mettrie was l..nown to have conceived man as a machine. Descartes could 
not quite bring himself to do so even though he fe lt tempted and compromised by seeing animals as automata 
and man as an insoluble duali ty. In recent years the machine has turned into a physico-chemical plant or a set of 
protein molecules with peculiar types of innate drives resulting from the chemistry of protein molecules. But it is 
difficult to conceive of a protein molecule rcnccting on its conception of prote in molecules; and even more 
difficult to understand how the sclf-reOection of machines o r chemical plants can dis tort the ir conceptions of 
themselves. Here lies the most peculiar paradox of man - he not only reOects upon his own nature, but allows 
these renections to innuencc his conception of himself and hi s world. Is it possible fo r him to arri ve at an 
adequate conception of himself, or is man doomed to sec himself only as he desires others to sec him" Even 
more interesting is the fact. as clinical psycho logists tell us, that men arc more concerned with threats to 
the mselves- for a threat to oneself may be met by overt action, while a threat to one's conception of onese lf is 
met by the development of neuro tic behavior. For thi s reason, Louis K. 0. argued that "men project their 
conceptions of themselves into all they do or so the clinician believes. So Sartrc's view of reality is but a 
projection of his view of himself, as the views of Kant project his personality, and the views of William James 
project his" (Kattsoff, 1953:453). 
Anyone acquainted with the his tory of western thought would know that to speak of Greek philosophy and the 
theory of man is to recall at once the homo-memura doctrine o f the Sophists. In fact the diclllm "man is the 
measure of all things" is commonly assumed to be the result of the recognition of wide divergence of moral 
princ iples and the elevation of thi s divergence into a uni versal maxim. The doctrine has also been known to 
comprises a view of the nature o f man from which is derived this relativism. Plato's Theaetctu~ notes that the 
Sophist Protagoras was given the honor of having propounded the homomemura doctrine from where his dictum 
was formed. Socrates begins his refutation no t with considerations of moral quest ions but with an attack on the 
interpretation of the maxim as one which ident ifies appearance as perception. By this, Protagoras must have 
insisted that "all that men can possibly know arc things as they appear to him. However. this view, sllldics 
shows, foreshadows Kant philosophy which also believes that human knowledge is limited by the senses of man. 
They hold that these senses alone can be appealed to in a final contest or debate. Katsoff corroborates this view 
when he said that: 
It is not man's willfulness or arbi trariness that makes him the ultimate judge 
of "things that are, that they arc, and of things that are not, that they arc not. " 
I low e lse can you judge that thinNs are except by human experience and 
knowledge? Kattsoff, 1953:45-+). 116 
The truth about the above position is further brought to light when Laszlo Verscnyi dec lared that ··The brevity of 
the fragment and the absence of direct e laboration by Protagoras about the meaning of the postulate gave rise to 
e ndless controversy about its meaning" (Verscn) i, 1962). 
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One of the Socratic doctrines cons ider Philosophy as an acti vity that admi nisters the proper amount of purge to 
the soul -a more effecti ve purge than any special science or sciences could offer. It becomes very necessary and 
natural of Socrates to want to purge the theory by Protagoras. For Socrates. it wa~ his natural business or put 
more correc tl y, it was his divinely appointed task to go about to administer this purge to people who thought 
they knew better, in this case; Protagoras. Let us also add at this point that Protagoras was, in fact. the mo~t 
formidable opponent that Socrates ever had. In the Theactetus, or at least in the first and larger part or it, 
Socrates made hi s counter-attack, and scored a complete triumph. In fact, he did his work so well that it was 
done once and for all. That is why, s ince Protagoras' anarchical principle is always breaking out afresh, never 
perhaps more seriously than at the present day, when all standards are called in question, it is well worth while to 
study carefully the manner in which Socrates proved the Truth of Pro tagoras to be untrue. That however will be 
the subject of another paper. What we arc most interested in here are the d irect criticism which Socrates offered 
to Protagoras' maxim 
5.1. Criticism of the Theory 
Burrell ( 1932) identified three simple criticisms that we find qu ite interesting in a study he made on the Greek 
sophists. We shall be adopting these theses criticism for the d iscussion we wish to make in this part of the study. 
( I ). The Fist argument we wish to consider here is o f the nature of argwnemwn ad hominem. It is surprising that 
so clever a man as Protagoras did not sec that he proved more than he intended, for accord ing to his theory. not 
onl y arc all men - the wise and the foolish- reduced to the same level, but on the plane of sentient experience. it 
is just as true therefore to say that a pig or a tadpole is the measure of all thi ngs. 
(2). A c ritical look at the maxim reveals that the li fe of Protagoras has to a large extent, systematicall y violated 
hi s own very creed. If what he preached was ·'true", then he had no ri ght to preach. s ince hi s doctrines showed 
that hi s d isciples, without any instruction from him, were as wise as h imself. He had fooled them into believing 
that he could make them wiser than they were, and therefore had taken their fees under false pretences. It looks, 
indeed. as if he had been talking with his tongue in his cheek, and while nattering people that they were equal to 
the gods, to whom the maxim applies no less than to men. By implication. he really made them out to be no 
higher than tadpoles. 
(3). Another careful look at the maxim seem to comple tely stultifies Socrates' arts of midwifery and the whole 
practice of d ialectics, for in Socrates opinion, it is utter nonsense to investigate and try to refute another's 
opinion, when every man's opinion is correc t. The question that we can' t help asking therefore is, ''Is the ''Trut h" 
of Protagoras truth, or is it on ly a sort of solemn jest"? 
5.2. Knowledge Is Perception 
The Protagorian perspectives about the gods and their existe nce; to a large extent, have not helped his cause in 
the 'man measure' maxim ... which is considered a major proponent of agnosticism, he was knO\m to have been 
of the opinion that: ·'Concerning the gods, I have no means of knowing whether they ex ist or not or of what sort 
they may be, because of the o bscurity of the subject, and the brevity of human li fe" (TIEP. 2008). This position 
abou t the god and the li mi tations of man punctures his claims about the place of man in the ·man 111emtm/ 
maxim. This further gives us reasons to equate the entire maxim by Protagoras alongside the famous theorem in 
philosophy which holds that: "K11ow/edge is Perceptio11". 
Taking Protagoras strictly by his words in the maxim, in the light of this theorem 'knowledge is perception.· 
Socrates attacks the theorem with the v iew to showing how fa lse this maxim could be by mere appealing to fact~ 
of experience. " If we have no t learned a foreign language for instance, do we know it by merely hearing it 
spoke n or seeing the script"? (Burrell , 1932: 196) Socrates asked. If that be the case, we must deny that we hear 
the words or sec the writing, which we do no l understand. If we ha ve learnt it, then we know its meaning. thai is. 
what we cannot sec or hear. Invariably, we can infer that knowledge and perception arc therefore, not ident ica l in 
learning a language. 
In another example Socrates uses the case of memory to further buttress hi s points. He argued that if you know 
what you remember to have seen, you must at least know what you have j ust seen when you shut your eye~. 
Hence you know what you do not sec, unless you fo rget everything you see as soon as you cca~e to sec it. Thl\. 
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however, is not the case for the scenario in question. Once again therefore, knowledge is not and cannot be 
equated directly to be inferred from percept ion as Protagoras has proposed in his theory. 
From the examples enumerated above, Burrell yet identifies a great absurdity that is inferred in the case in point: 
"the absurdi ty of knowing and not knowing the same thing at the same time" 1211. T his is because if you cover 
one eyes, you sec (i.e. know) with one eye and do not sec ( i.e. do not know) wi th the other. The hypothesis 
therefore is: " I know what I see" and "I sec what I know". But there is the case of " I do not know what I see" and 
" I see what I do not know" . Socrates further argued. 
CONLUSION 
In a s imilar ins tance, we may ask: " Is my knowledge of a thing just the same whenever I sec it a yard or a mi le 
away, docs it mauer whether I sec it dimly or clearly, and so on. Obviously, these above instances seem to knock 
the base out of the theory and to prove that the theorem which invariably declared error to be imposs ible is itself 
erroneous. 
Now bearing in mind the posit ion of Protagoras which is that " that which appears to each man is real to ham to 
whom it appears", Protagoras messed up his own case when he admitted that certai n persons. 't he wise and the 
good', the Doctors and the husbandman excel others in respect to what is bcllcr and worse. This sadly implies 
their be lief that both wisdom and ignorance exist amongst them and by wisdom and ignorance. they mean true 
and false opinions respectively. Now according to the doctrine of Protagoras, this opinion is true. Such the 
conception invariably leads to a dilemma. Contemporary th inkers can' t help wondering whether the opinion of 
men arc some times true and someti mes false, or whe ther we should assume that they arc always true. It follows 
in either case that their opinions are not always true, but may be ei ther true or false. One simple inference we can 
deduce from this position is that Protagoras opinion is true to himself but fa lse to thousands of others. 
Protagoras we know from his profess ion of teaching others and h is admission that some men arc wiser than 
o thers about bcllcr and worse, then it must fo llow that hi s " truth" is truth to no one else. This conclusion brings 
us to another smart result and position which Burrell identifi es: 
In admiuing the truth of the opinions of those who think that his opinion is false. he admits 
that his own opinion is fa lse. And as the o thers refuse to admit that they are in error in thinking 
hi s opinion false, while Protagoras. by virtue o f his dictum, has to admit that the ir refusal to 
acknowledge the mselves in error is true, therefore all men, beginning with Protagoras. admi t 
that "neither a dog nor any casual man" is a measure of anything whatsoever that he has not 
learned (Burrell , 1932: 137). 
So it fo llows that the "Truth" of Protagoras is true, not on ly to nobody else, but not even to himself. Put 
simply, the opinion which acknowledges the truth of its deni al cannot be true. 
The presuppos ition of the theory that "knowledge is perception" is that perception is always of real ity. and that 
there is an exact correspondence between what is perceived and perception. Plato's (Thcactctus 1974:5 12) It is 
always true and incapable of error. That is, it is always in possession of the truth, because it is always perception 
of the reality, and is therefore knowledge. Knowledge is apprehending the truth of the reality. which perception 
apprehends. It follows that you can never know anythi ng the truth of wh ich you fai l to alta in (Plato. 1974: 186). 
But the preceding argument has shown conclusively that reality is not to be found in the impress ions of sense. 
e.g. the hardness of the hard , etc., through touch wi th which the soul is affected, through the body, and therefore 
the soul never reaches the truth of the reality through that channel. It is, therefore. impossible to fi nd knowledge 
there ei ther. Reality is only to be found in the reasoning about the impressions, i.e. in observation, comparison, 
and rc nection on the common or universal aspects of th ings, which the soul observes by its own powers 
independently of the senses. These processes are quite different from sense perception. 
Therefore we argue that knowledge or the attainment of the truth about reality is no t the same thing as 
perception, in which it is imposs ible to find either truth or realit y, the attainment of wh ich is the indispensable 
condi tion of knowledge. This whole idea makes a mess of the conception of truth as proposed by Protagoras, the 
conception of the universal nux by llcraclitus, the definition of truth by Theaetetus. By implication. whi le the 
truth of Protagoras stultifies the dialectic of Socrates, it invariab ly stultifies itself. In order to upset the sophism 
that "all opinions arc true," Socrates had to demonstrate the ex istence of falsehood. and he did it in the most 
piquant way by proving the error of the denial of error. Protagoras, too, denied the d ifference between 
appearance and real ity, because all appearances arc real; but in his own person he produced the most start li ng 
evidence that some appearances are unreal; for what appeared to him proved to be a misrepresentation of rea lit y. 
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Thus Socrates somewhat paradoxically establishe~ the ex istence o f Lruth on the certain fact of error (Burrell. 
1932: 162). 
In closing. we in identifying the degree of success achieved by Socrates in the auad. on Protagora\· ·man 
measure' 1hcory, we can note that his argument against Protagoras could be described in modern tcrrm as a 
triumphant exposure of subjectivism, relativism. pragma1ism, or whatever be the fashionable name for plau'>ible 
and shallow skepticism. In the Platonic language. it might be described as a duel between dialectic and rhetoric, 
appearance and reality, being and becoming or between sophistry and philosophy. In Socrates' own language. it 
is a demonstratio n that 1hc "truth" of Protagoras is unt rue. Perhaps it might be appropriately described as the 
most brilliant exh ibition in the Platonic dialogues o f the Socratic Method in the act o f vind icating il s own 
validi ty. Aristotle, with hi s customary pcnctrmion. has analyzed it into its elements as contained in his well-
known passage (Plato's Metaphysics, 1978:24) he says that "two thi ngs may fa irly be ascribed to Socrates-
inducti ve arguments and universal definition. both of which are concerned with the Marting-point of knowledge." 
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